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Gardner: Gardner: Affair to Remember:

An Affair to Remember: Further
Refinement of the Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
State v. White'

I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous decisions by the United States Supreme Court make clear that
a defendant in a criminal trial is constitutionally entitled to disclosure of
exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution if there is a reasonable
probability that the evidence would affect the outcome of the trial. 2
Nevertheless, prosecutors frequently fail to disclose such evidence Such failure
is attributable to a lack of incentive for prosecutors to disclose potentially
exculpatory evidence. This problem could be largely solved by more stringent
enforcement of the states' respective rules of professional conduct.
In State v. White, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District
accepted an innovative theory offered by the defense as to how exculpatory
evidence would have affected the result of the trial. This Note argues that the
court's holding was correct because acceptance of such innovative theories will
provide more incentive for prosecutors to follow the constitutional and ethical
rules mandating disclosure of exculpatory evidence.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1998, Theodore White's twelve-year-old adopted daughter accused him
of sexually molesting her.4 The accusations arose during divorce proceedings
between White and his wife, Tina White.5 Detective Richard McKinley was
assigned to investigate the case.6 Detective McKinley and Tina White soon
became romantically involved.7 The Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney's
Office learned about this relationship shortly after it began.'

1. 81 S.W.3d 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
2. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
3. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:Independence, Power,andthe
Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 431 (2001).
4. White, 81 S.W.3d. at 564.

5. Id. at 563.
6. Id. at 564.

7. Id. at 565.
8. Id.
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The Whites' daughter told investigators of several instances in which she
had been molested by her father.9 During the investigation, Detective McKinley
examined the daughter's diary, but returned it to her after concluding that it
contained no evidence that would incriminate White.'" The diary was
subsequently lost and was unavailable at trial. " Eventually, Detective McKinley
executed a probable cause statement and the State of Missouri filed charges
against White in April of 1998.12 During a deposition, Detective McKinley
denied any interest in the outcome of the case. 3 At trial, Tina White testified
and corroborated the accusations made by her daughter, 4 and Theodore White
was convicted of twelve counts relating to the alleged sexual abuse.' 5
After the conviction, but before sentencing, one of White's defense
attorneys received a telephone call from a co-worker of Tina White. 6 The coworker informed the attorney of Tina White's romantic involvement with
Detective McKinley. 7 The defense attorney discussed the matter with the
Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and learned that the prosecutor
had become aware of the relationship soon after it began, nearly a year earlier."8
After learning this, White's defense attorneys filed a motion for a new trial,
alleging prosecutorial misconduct. ' In addition, they requested that the Jackson
County prosecutor's office be disqualified.2"
In the motion, White alleged that the prosecutor intentionally misled the
jury by deliberately concealing the romantic relationship between Tina White
and Detective McKinley.2 Specifically, he argued that the prosecutor misled the
jury by asserting that it would be absurd to believe that Tina White would have

9. Id. at 564.
10.
1i.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.

Id.
at 567.
Id.
Id.The court noted that although Tina White's testimony was not strongly

corroborative, it was consistent with the specific instances described in her daughter's
testimony. Id. at 564-65.
15. Id. at 563 ("White was convicted of two counts of rape, three counts of child
molestation in the first degree, two counts of child molestation in the second degree, four
counts of statutory sodomy, and one count of furnishing pornographic material to a
minor." The court sentenced him to fifty years in prison.).
16. Id. at 565.
17. Id.
18. Id. When it learned of the relationship, the prosecutor's office held a meeting
and decided that the information about the relationship was not relevant or material and
did not need to be disclosed to White's defense attorneys. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 567.
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given false testimony concerning the sexual abuse allegations.22 White also
noted that an assistant prosecuting attorney remained silent during Detective
McKinley's deposition when he denied any interest in the outcome of the case,
even though she knew that Detective McKinley was romantically involved with
Tina White, who stood to benefit financially in the divorce settlement if her
husband was found to have engaged in marital misconduct.23 In sum, White
argued that the prosecutor's failure to disclose the information violated his
constitutional rights under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Brady v. Maryland.2"
In response, the state argued that the prosecutor was under no duty to
disclose information about the relationship because it was not material to the
case." The state pointed out that the relationship between Tina White and
Detective McKinley began after the allegations of sexual abuse had surfaced.26
The state further argued that there was other evidence to impeach Tina White
relating to her financial motives and desire to gain a favorable outcome in the
divorce.27
The trial court denied White's motion for a new trial.2" White appealed to
the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District,29 which reversed and
remanded, holding that the information about the relationship was exculpatory
evidence that should have been disclosed.3" The court reasoned that the
information about the romantic relationship could have been used by the defense
to impeach Tina White's testimony.3 1 Specifically, the court found that the
defense could have argued that Tina White was so concerned with obtaining a
conviction against her estranged husband that she was willing to initiate a
relationship with the lead detective on the case to gain influence with the
prosecution.32 The court agreed with White that the information could have
reasonably affected the result of the trial.33 Thus, the court held that the

22. Id. At trial the prosecution argued, "So then I guess we have the conspiracy
theory here, that Tina manipulated this whole thing. Well, why did Tina manipulate this
whole thing?" The prosecution continued, "we still haven't figured out why it would
benefit Tina White in any way, shape, or form to do such a thing." Id. at 569.
23. Id. at 567.
24. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
25. White, 81 S.W.3d at 567.
26. id.
27. Id. A defense motion indicated that Tina White had received assets valued at
more than $550,000 in the divorce proceeding. Id. at 569.
28. Id. at 565.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 571.
31. Id. at 570.
32. Id. at 569.
33. Id. at 570.
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prosecution's failure to disclose the information about the romantic relationship
between the defendant's estranged wife and the lead detective on the case
violated the defendant's due process rights because it denied him the opportunity
to impeach their credibility, which might have affected the outcome of the trial.34
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. ConstitutionalFramework
The prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant has
evolved significantly over the years. In 1935, the United States Supreme Court
held in Mooney v. Holohan35 that use of evidence known to be false by a

prosecutor violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 The
Court specifically held that knowing use of perjured testimony by the state was
unconstitutional.37 The Mooney holding was later expanded in Napue v.
Illinois3" to include situations where prosecutors fail to correct testimony they
know to be false.39 The Court noted that this rule applies even if "the false
testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness."40
In 1963, in the landmark case Brady v. Maryland,4 the United States
Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's duty to disclose went further than the
mere duty to not use false testimony. 2 In Brady, the defendant was accused of
murder and claimed that his accomplice, Boblit, actually killed the victim. 3
Prior to trial, the defendant had requested that the prosecutor disclose all of
Boblit's extra-judicial statements." The prosecutor disclosed several statements,
but a statement in which Boblit admitted to the killing was not disclosed to the
defendant until after he had been tried and convicted. 5 Presented with these
facts, the Court held that nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence violates due
process when the evidence is "material either to guilt or to punishment,

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
294 U.S. 103 (1935).
Id. ati 12-13.
Id. at 112.
360 U.S. 264 (1959).
Id. at 269-70.
Id.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).

42. See id. at 87.
43. Id. at 84.
44. Id.
45. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss2/4

4

Gardner: Gardner: Affair to Remember:

2003]

PROSECUTORS' DUTY TO DISCLOSE

irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."" The Court,
however, provided no definition of "material."
The definition of exculpatory evidence was also later expanded in Giglio
v. United States47 to include evidence that the defense could use to impeach the
credibility of government witnesses.48 In this case, the Court declared that
"[w]hen the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this
general rule" and must be disclosed.49
Thirteen years after Brady, the Court, in UnitedStates v. Agurs," addressed
the issue of whether a prosecutor is required to disclose favorable evidence not
specifically requested by the defendant.51 The Court distinguished three
situations in which a Brady claim may arise: (1) when previously undisclosed
evidence reveals the prosecution used testimony that it either knew or should
have known was perjured; (2) when the prosecution fails to disclose a specific
kind of exculpatory evidence requested by the defense; and (3) when the
prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence that the defense either never
requested or requested only in a general manner.5 2 The Court found that
prosecutors have a duty to disclose in all three situations, but noted that if there
was not a specific request, a higher standard of materiality existed such that the
prosecution has a duty to disclose only when suppression of the evidence would
be "of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a
fair trial."" When a specific request has been made by the defense, on the other
hand, the materiality standard is met "if the
omitted evidence creates a
54
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.
In 1985, the Court promulgated a uniform standard of materiality in United
States v. Bagley." In Bagley, the Court again56 denied any distinction between
exculpatory and impeachment evidence" and abandoned the distinction between

46. Id. at 87.
47. 405 U.S. 150 -(1972). The Court reversed and remanded because the
government failed to disclose that a prosecution witness had been made a promise of

leniency for a future case. Id. at 154-55.
48. Id.at 154.
49. Id.(quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)).

50. 427 U.S. 97 (1976),
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. Id. at 108.
54. Id. at 112.
55. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).

56. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
57. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
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the "specific request," "general request," and "no request" circumstances
described in Agurs."8
According to the new standard, materiality exists if there is a "reasonable
probability"59 that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the
exculpatory or impeachment evidence had been disclosed to the defense. 6° A
"reasonable probability" was defined by the Court as "a probability sufficient to
6
undermine confidence in the outcome." 1
The "reasonable probability" standard was reaffirmed by the Court in Kyles
v. Whitley.62 The Kyles Court emphasized that the question was whether the
exculpatory evidence "could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such
a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. ' 63 Furthermore,
materiality is to be determined not by the individual effect of each piece of
evidence but by the cumulative effect of all the non-disclosed evidence.6 The
Kyles Court also considered whether prosecutors were charged with discovering
and disclosing exculpatory evidence known to other law enforcement
organizations. 65 The Court concluded that prosecutors have a duty "to learn of
any favorable evidence known to 66the others acting on the government's behalf
in the case, including the police.
Four years later, in Strickler v. Greene,67 the Court restated that the Brady
rule applied to require the disclosure of evidence if: (1) the evidence is favorable
to the accused because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was
either willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state; and (3) the suppression
resulted in prejudice to the defendant."
B. ProfessionalEthics Considerations
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
have been implemented in many states, including Missouri.69 Under the Rules,
prosecutors have "the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not simply that
58. Id. at 682.
59. The "reasonable probability" test was taken from the Court's decision in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in which the Court used the test in the
context of an allegation of ineffective counsel. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).

63. Id. at 435.
64. Id. at 436.
65. Id. at 437.
66. Id.
67. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
68. Id. at 281-82.
69. See Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-3.8 (2002).
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of an advocate."7 Specifically, Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules states that a
prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
[M]ake timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused
or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose
to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating
information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is
relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal. 7'
The ethical obligations imposed by this rule differ in several respects from
the constitutional requirements set forth in Brady and its progeny.72 One of the
primary differences is that the model rule is not limited to material evidence. In
this sense it is broader than the Brady requirement." On the other hand, the
model rule is also narrower because it does not hold the prosecutor accountable
for favorable evidence that is in the sole possession of another law enforcement
entity, such as the police, as is constitutionally required under Kyles v. Whitley.74
In 2000, a commission reviewed the ABA's Model Rules and left Rule
3.8(d) unchanged.75 The commission did, however, recommend that the
Comment to 3.8(d) be revised to state that "[e]vidence tending to negate the guilt
of the accused includes evidence that materially tends to impeach a government
witness."76 Although impeachment evidence is already considered to be
included in "evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the accused," this revision
would have added a materiality requirement for impeachment evidence that does
not exist for traditional exculpatory evidence.77 In the end, the proposed
Comment was not included in the 2002 version of the Model Rules. 8

70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cnt. (2002).
71. MODELRULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 3.8(d) (2002). This rule is identical to

Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4-3.8(d) (2002).

72. See Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1205, 1206 (2000).
73. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) (noting that the constitutional
rules require less of the prosecution than the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct); Kurcias, supra note 72, at 1206.
74. See Kurcias, supra note 72, at 1216.
75. AM. BAR. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT, Proposed Rule 3.8 (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/

cpr/rule38.html.
76. Id. at cmt. 4.
77. See id.; Kurcias, supra note 72, at 1206.
78. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2002).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

IV. THE

(Vol. 68

INSTANT DECISION

In State v. White,79 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District
held that the prosecutor's failure to disclose that Tina White, the defendant's
estranged wife and mother of the victim, was involved in a romantic relationship
with the lead detective on the case violated the defendant's due process rights
under the standards promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in Brady
v. Maryland and its progeny.8" First, the court held that White's due process
rights were violated by the assistant prosecuting attorney's failure to correct
Detective McKinley's deposition testimony when he stated that he did not have
any interest in the outcome of the case.8' The court's reasoning, at this point,
was based on the principle established in Napue v. Illinoiss2 that due process is
violated not only when a prosecutor fails to correct testimony on a substantive
issue that he or she knows to be false, but also when the false testimony relates
to the witness's credibility. 3 In White, the court accepted White's argument that
the assistant prosecutor knew that Detective McKinley was not being truthful
when he denied any interest in the case, and, because of this, the assistant
prosecuting attorney's failure to correct the testimony violated White's due
process rights.
The court then examined the theories put forward by the defense as to how
the information about the romantic relationship between Tina White and
Detective McKinley could have been used to impeach their credibility.84 The
court accepted White's argument that White lost the opportunity to prepare a
more effective defense based on the theory that Tina White was so intent on
ensuring that her estranged husband was convicted that she initiated a romantic
relationship with the lead detective on the case.8" The court agreed that, by
showing this, White would have been able to impeach Tina White's credibility
by suggesting that anyone who would go to such great lengths would be likely
to distort the facts in order to corroborate her daughter's allegations.86 In sum,
the court accepted White's argument that evidence of the relationship with
Detective McKinley would have strengthened his defense that Tina White used
her daughter's allegations as a divorce strategy, which would have significantly

79. 81 S.W.3d 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). Judge Smart authored the opinion, with
which Judges Ellis and Lowenstein concurred. Id. at 561, 571.

80. Id.at 570.

81. Id.
at 568 (citing Hutchison v. State, 59 S.W.3d 494,496 (Mo. 2001)).
82. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
83. See White, 81 S.W.3d at 568. Although the White court did not directly cite
Napue, the numerous cases that it did cite directly relied on Napue.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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diminished the weight given to Tina White's testimony corroborating her
daughter's allegations."
The court also agreed that, had the romantic
relationship between Tina White and Detective McKinley been disclosed, the
defense would have been able to impeach Detective McKinley's testimony, and
his police work in general, by arguing that he had a motive for failing to keep the
daughter's diary,88 which was lost and unavailable for examination at trial.8 9
Taking all of this into account, the court concluded that the evidence about
the relationship could have been helpful to the defense "not because the evidence
was itself exculpatory, but because it would have tended to support the primary
theory of the defense."'9 Specifically, the evidence would have strengthened the
theory that even if Tina White did not fabricate the allegations, her corroborating
testimony was more likely to be unreliable because she went to such great
lengths to have influence with the prosecution. 9 ' The court also found that
Detective McKinley's failure to return the diary would have fit into this theory
because he inexplicably returned potentially valuable evidence to the possession
of the victim and the defendant's estranged wife.92
The court then applied the "reasonable probability" materiality standard
promulgated in United States v. Bagley93 to the facts and concluded that, had the
information about the relationship been available for the defendant to impeach
the police work and the testimony of Tina White, it would have been "reasonably
likely to [have] affect[ed] the result of the trial." 94 The court noted that the jury
could have reached a different verdict if it believed that there was a reasonable
possibility that, even if Tina White did not concoct the allegations, she
encouraged them and arguably altered her own testimony in order to corroborate
them, and possibly even caused the loss of the diary.9" The court agreed with
White that the information was important enough that the failure to disclose the
information deprived him of a fair trial and undermined confidence in the
verdict.96 The court did acknowledge that the prosecution failed to disclose the
information in the good faith belief that it was not material, 97 but the court also
noted that the intent of the prosecution is irrelevant in a Brady violation case.98
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 569.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 570.

93. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
94. White, 81 S.W.3d at 570.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 571 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); State v. Aaron,
985 S.W.2d. 434, 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)).
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In sum, the court concluded that the prosecution's failure to provide the
information about the relationship between the defendant's wife and Detective
McKinley deprived White of his due process rights in that it prevented him from
using the information to impeach their credibility, which might have affected the
outcome of his trial. 99
V. COMMENT
The holding by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District in
State v. White did not promulgate any novel rule of law. The decision is
noteworthy, however, because it is one of a host of cases handed down every
year in which prosecutors are held to have violated their constitutional duties
under Brady and its progeny. °' The case is also important because it shows how
courts may be willing to accept more innovative theories to find that there has
been a Brady violation.
Violations of the duty to disclose Brady materials are among the most
frequent instances of prosecutorial misconduct.'
The high rate at which the
Brady rule is violated can be attributed to the lack of incentive for the prosecutor
to disclose materials to the defense. Critics of the Supreme Court's "reasonable
probability" standard for materiality argue that such a high bar discourages
prosecutors from disclosing exculpatory evidence.'0 2 Proponents of this
argument suggest that prosecutors may be willing to take the relatively small
chance of a conviction being overturned in order to obtain a conviction in the
first place."0 3
Moreover, the risk of the conviction being overturned exists only when the
defense learns about the exculpatory evidence. 4 Even then, if the defense
learns of the evidence and decides to appeal a conviction, it may have failed to
properly preserve the error arising from the Brady violation.0 5 Thus, the critics

99. Id. at 570.
100. See Davis, supra note 3, at 431.
101. Davis, supra note 3, at 431.
102. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. PITr. L. REv. 393,438
(1992); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutorsfor Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 697 (1987); Joseph R. Weeks, No
Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutorsto
Disclose ExculpatoryEvidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 833, 870 (1997).
103. Weeks, supra note 102, at 870.
104. Weeks, supra note 102, at 870.
105. Walter W. Steele, Jr., UnethicalProsecutorsandInadequate Discipline,38
Sw. L. J. 965, 977 (1984).
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contend, the Supreme Court's "reasonable probability" standard provides little
incentive for prosecutorial compliance with the Brady disclosure rule. 6
This view was asserted by Justice Marshall in his dissent in United States
v. Bagley.'°7 In his dissent, Justice Marshall advocated a rule that would require
the prosecution to disclose all favorable evidence, regardless of whether it would
have an effect on the outcome of the trial.' He criticized the "reasonable
probability" standard as "virtually deffying] definition" because it looks not at
the potential usefulness of the favorable evidence in preparing and presenting the
defendant's case, but rather, it looks retrospectively to the impact the evidence
would have on the actual outcome of the trial.' 0 9
Despite the fact that the "reasonable probability" standard has been severely
criticized by judges and scholars alike, it is likely to remain in effect. The
Supreme Court reaffirmed the high standard of materiality in Kyles v. Whitley" '
and, more recently, in Strickler v. Greene."' Under the present makeup of the
Court, it seems highly unlikely that a lower standard of materiality, of the sort
proposed by Justice Marshall, will be accepted. Accordingly, other incentives
for prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence must be examined.
The threat of disciplinary sanctions would appear to be an adequate
incentive for prosecutors to disclose information to the defense. Despite the near
unanimous adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct by the states,
however, prosecutors are rarely sanctioned for Brady violations. " Professor
Richard A. Rosen surveyed lawyer disciplinary bodies in every state in the mid1980s." 3 His research discovered only nine instances in which disciplinary
proceedings had been pursued against a prosecutor for Brady violations." 4
Furthermore, in thirty-five of the forty-one states that responded to his survey,
no complaints had ever been filed regarding a violation of Brady obligations." 5
Ten years after Professor Rosen's findings, another survey revealed that only
seven additional proceedings had been commenced based on allegations of
Brady violations.""

106. See Gershman, supranote 102, at 438; Rosen, supranote 102, at 697; Weeks,
supra note 102, at 870.
107. 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 699 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

109. Id. at 699-700 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).

111. 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).
112. See Rosen, supranote 102, at 697; Weeks, supra note 102, at 869-70.
113. Rosen, supra note 102, at 697.
114. Rosen, supra note 102, at 720.
115. Rosen, supranote 102, at 730-3 1.
116. Weeks, supra note 102, at 881.
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The disciplinary rules set by state boards have been a well-meaning, but
obviously ineffectual, attempt to encourage prosecutors to disclose favorable
evidence to defendants." 7 The result is that prosecutors have virtually no
incentive, other than their own sense of ethics, to disclose favorable evidence to
the defense. Still, even the most ethical prosecutor can fail to see that evidence
is of the sort that needs to be disclosed." 8 Critics have argued that many
prosecutors are institutionally incapable of performing the objective weighing of
the materiality of potentially exculpatory evidence." 9 Some critics point to the
unique role of prosecutors and the delicate balance in being both "minister[s] of
justice ' and "zealous advocate[s]."''
The prosecutor is, in theory,
fundamentally different from the defense attorney because she always believes
that she is seeking justice for the people at large. While the defense attorney can
ethically defend a person he believes to be guilty, the ethical prosecutor only
pursues convictions of those she believes are blameworthy. 122 Because the
ethical prosecutor always believes the defendant is guilty, it becomes easy for her
to view potentially exculpatory evidence as immaterial. 213 The natural tendency
is to discount evidence favorable to the defendant as unimportant because it does
not support the prosecutor's belief in the ultimate fact-that the defendant is
guilty.' 24 Hence, prosecutors can, in good faith, downplay or overlook
exculpatory evidence because they have difficulty in acting as a "minister of
justice" rather than as a "zealous advocate."' 25 An alternate view is that some
prosecutors consciously choose to be "zealous advocates" in these situations, in
the belief that the adversary system itself works in favor ofjustice. Regardless
of the motivations of prosecutors to fail to disclose exculpatory evidence, the fact
remains that it is a widespread problem.
The obvious solution to the problem is rigorous enforcement of each of the
states' respective rules of professional conduct. If prosecutors were more
frequently sanctioned for Brady violations, they would have a much greater
incentive to disclose exculpatory evidence. The disciplinary rules have been

117. See Rosen, supra note 102, at 697.
118. See generally Randolph N. Jonakait, The EthicalProsecutor'sMisconduct,

23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550 (1987) (contending that highly ethical prosecutors may violate
disclosure requirements because they are systemically incapable of objectively observing
their disclosure obligations).
119. See generally id.; Weeks, supra note 102, at 869-70.
120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2002).
12 1. See Weeks, supra note 102, at 843; Fred C. Zacharias, Structuringthe Ethics
ofProsecutorialTrialPractice: CanProsecutorsDo Justice?,44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 107
(1991).
122. Jonakait, supra note 118, at 550.
123. See Jonakait, supra note 118, at 559.
124. See Jonakait, supra note 118, at 559.
125. Weeks, supra note 102, at 843.
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widely criticized as being ineffective. This could easily change, however, by
doing the unthinkable-actually enforcing them. Incentives provided by rules
of professional conduct would placate many of the critics of the "reasonable
probability" standard because most states' ethical rules are broader than the
Brady rule. 26 Especially in light of the fact that a lower constitutional standard
of materiality is unlikely to be implemented, the solution to the high rate of
Brady violations is stringent enforcement of the rules of professional conduct
imposed by every state. Furthermore, this solution is more likely to be effective
if rigorous enforcement can be combined with courts accepting innovative
theories of materiality.
In State v. White, the court did accept a unique and innovative approach to
consider how information could have been used to impeach state witnesses.
Violations of Brady concerning impeachment evidence generally involve a
limited variety of circumstances. Impeachment evidence that relates directly to
the facts of the case often involves situations where a promise of leniency is
made to an accomplice in exchange for testimony.' 27 Prior inconsistent
statements of eyewitnesses concerning identification of the defendant are also
frequently used for impeachment purposes.'28 General impeaching evidence
frequently involves past criminal records or promises of leniency in prior
criminal cases,' 29 but on less frequent occasions, can also include prior
allegations of misconduct or incompetence made against police or expert
witnesses.130

The probative value of impeaching evidence varies according to its relation
to the facts at issue in the case.' The earlier example of an eyewitness who
previously misidentified a defendant would likely be considered "clearly
exculpatory."' 3 2 Other exculpatory evidence might not be so clear and may
require additional inferences from the court.'33 For example, in UnitedStates v.
Agurs,'34 the defendant claimed self-defense to a charge of murder.'35 The
prosecutor did not disclose that the victim had a prior record for assault and

126. See, e.g., Kurcias, supra note 72, at 1206.
127. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 5.5(c) (1987).

128. Id.; see Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
129. GERSHMAN, supra note 127, § 5.5(c).
130. See, e.g., State v. Aaron, 985 S.W.2d 434,436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that although information about a medical examiner's prior professional misconduct and
alleged incompetence should have been disclosed, the information would not have
affected the result of the trial).
131. GERSHMAN, supra note 127, §5.5(c).
132. GERSHMAN, supra note 127, §5.5(c).
133. GERSHMAN, supra note 127, §5.5(c).
134. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
135. Id. at 99.
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carrying a deadly weapon. 13 6 The defendant claimed that the information about
the victim's criminal record could have been used to support her claim of selfdefense. " 7 This theory required further inferences that the victim was a violent
person and was, therefore, likely the aggressor in the struggle with the
defendant. 38
' Still, the weight and importance of this inferential link was crucial
to the defendant's theory of self-defense. Without it, the jury would have little
reason to believe that the victim was the aggressor.
The theory asserted by the defense in State v. White also required a number
of inferential steps in order to meet the required materiality standards. The
information about the romantic relationship between Tina White and Detective
McKinley led to the inference that she was willing to go as far as initiating a
romantic relationship with the lead detective on the case against her husband to
gain favor with the prosecution.'39 This led to the inference that, if she was
willing to initiate a relationship to ensure a conviction, she was also likely to
"shade the truth" in order to corroborate her daughter's allegations. 40 This could
have been used to impeach Tina White's corroborative testimony and lead to the
further inference that the daughter's claims were not independent of her mother's
influence.' 4' This inferential chain was crucial for White to show that there was
a reasonable probability that disclosure of the relationship would have affected
the outcome of the trial. The court's acceptance of the defense's theory of
materiality, therefore, rested on a chain of inferences that linked seemingly
unimportant evidence to the defense's theory that Tina White was an unreliable
witness who might have fabricated the allegations against the defendant. This,
however, was clearly correct, because upon deliberation, a jury might view the
information about the relationship as decisive in determining whether the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The inferential steps permitted to show how exculpatory and impeachment
evidence could have fit into a defense theory and affected the result of a trial are
a far cry from the original kind of exculpatory evidence anticipated by Brady v.
Maryland. One might conclude that in response to the high frequency of Brady
violations, courts may be willing to accept more innovative theories of
materiality, involving several inferential steps that link the evidence to the
defense's theory, in order to conclude that the result of the trial would have been
different had the exculpatory evidence been disclosed. This is a proper approach

136. Id. at 100-01.
137. Id. at 100. The Court denied the defendant a new trial based on a standard of
materiality that was later replaced by the "reasonable probability" standard set forth in
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
138. GERSHMAN, supra note 127, § 5.5(c).
139. See State v. White, 81 S.W.3d 561, 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
140. See id.
141. See id.
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that helps provide prosecutors with greater incentive to follow the constitutional
and ethical rules regarding disclosure of exculpatory evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
State v. White is one of a host of cases each year in which courts examine
alleged Brady violations. The frequency of these violations can be attributed to
the lack of an effective incentive for prosecutors to disclose potentially
exculpatory evidence. This lack of incentive results, in part, from the high
"reasonable probability" materiality standard promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court. Also responsible is the failure of most state disciplinary boards
to strongly enforce the ethical rules requiring disclosure of Brady material.
Because the "reasonable probability" standard is unlikely to be modified anytime
soon, the solution to the problem of frequent Brady violations by prosecutors
may lie in the enforcement of rules of professional conduct already in existence.
Until this is done, however, courts, such as the court in State v. White, should be

willing to accept more innovative theories of materiality to find a violation of the
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.
MICHAEL E. GARDNER
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